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THE BEAR AND THE DRAGON

What is the real situation between Russia and China?

How does it affect the United States?

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Will China and Russia stick together, and if so how long? Does China's action in Korea show that China is a puppet of Russia? Will China become a second and stronger Yugoslavia? How does American policy and action affect the situation?

The answers are of immediate and vital importance to Americans and to the entire free world. To find the answers we must first look at the record, and especially the recent record, of China's relations with Russia.

Russian imperialism: before Yalta

A remote incident in Manchuria in 1929 was the precursor of World War II and a preview of Russia's post-war tactics.

July 24, 1929, was the day President Herbert Hoover had fixed for a solemn celebration of the Kellogg-Briand treaty outlawing war. Two weeks earlier, China had removed the Soviet Russian manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Mr. Emshanoff, charging that he and the other Russian employees were conducting subversive propaganda. In May the Chinese had raided the Russian Consulate in Harbin, finding evidence to that end. And Russia had been arresting Chinese merchants in Siberia.

On July 18, 1929, Secretary of State Stimson asked the help of Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Germany in preventing a conflict of arms. But Russia rejected mediation. In October, General Feng Yu-hsiang, who often worked with the Russians, started a serious civil war in Central China. By November Russia had made its military

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preparations and attacked. After a short fight on the frontiers, Russian forces were victorious. China agreed to restore a Russian as railway manager, a key spot.

Here Russia had showed that an aggressor could act in certain areas by clever and bold means without the serious opposition of other countries. Japan took the lesson to heart, and was encouraged to seize all Manchuria beginning in September, 1931. Then came Mussolini in Ethiopia and Hitler in Europe.

Here also we have a preview of Russian tactics. Even then it was the Kremlin's policy to stir revolt in other countries, to use force against its neighbors and to single out the United States for attack. The Communist International in its issue of August 31, 1929, denounced Stimson's mediation as "American imperialism", and charged the United States with trying "to put its hand, in some form or other, on the Chinese Eastern Railway." * That line of abuse has a familiar sound today.

* Quoted in Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia, page 265.

Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931-32 brought together Russia and Nationalist China in an uneasy alliance. This broke up about 1943. Now it is replaced by alliance between Russia and Communist China.

The Chinese Communists are now telling their people that their invasion of Korea is a fight against "imperialism." They are telling their troops that, if they do not fight the Americans in Korea, they will have to fight them on their own soil. They do this to raise a smoke screen - to try to turn China's growing nationalism against the United States and the free world. And also to whitewash Russia.

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This comes, strangely enough, at a time when Russia is the only power whose imperialism is a serious threat to other peoples.

Also it ignores the plain fact that in the past Russia's imperialism has been far more costly to China than that of any country but Japan.

The Great Wall, finished 2,000 years ago, is a monument to China's fear of aggression from the north and west. But let us deal with more recent times.

Russia, expanding eastward to occupy Northern Asia, got a firm footing on the Pacific only a hundred years ago. This, by a historic coincidence, was just when the United States reached the Pacific in its westward expansion. In 1858 and 1860 Russia took advantage of China being involved in war with England and France, and forced China to give up all the land north of the Amur River, the present border of Manchuria. Thus Russia got Vladivostok and its "Maritime Provinces".

Then Russia went ahead with plans to seize Manchuria - the "bloody triangle" which China, Russia and Japan have so long struggled to control. Manchuria is one of the world's richest regions in natural resources - land, timber and mines. Its control would give to Russia an ice-free port on the Yellow Sea.

Around the turn of the century, Russian designs on Manchuria were defeated but not ended. First the Russians were balked by diplomacy - the opposition of Britain, France and Japan, with the United States also taking part through John Hay's open door policy from 1899. Diplomacy gave place to war when Japan pushed Russia out of Manchuria in 1904-05.

It then was Japan's innings. Yet Russia for part of the time was able to claim a sphere of influence in Northern Manchuria. In 1907 Russia and Japan agreed secretly upon a division of interests - staking out claims in North and South Manchuria respectively.

Meanwhile Russia was using every means to encroach in Central Asia. Outer Mongolia was under Chinese suzerainty, but wanted to be independent. By 1921 Outer Mongolia had fallen under full Russian control. Here Communist Russia used for the first time the methods of penetration and deceit which have since become common in overcoming neighboring states.

Also Russia sought, with varying success, to extend its influence over China's Central Asian province of Sinkiang, "Chinese Turkestan".

Russia's main encroachment on China, however, was not in territory seized. It was rather by Communist penetration. Even before the Communists were firmly in control of all of Russia, they gave high priority to action in China.

First the young Chinese Communist party, under directions from Moscow, worked with the Kuomintang. When Chiang Kai-shek, early in 1927, found the leftist elements under-cutting him by direction of the Russians he acted firmly. He broke with both, sent the Russian advisers home, and set up the Nationalist Government as an independent regime in Nanking.

This caused a furor in Moscow. David J. Dallin, in his authoritative book, "The Rise of Russia in Asia" (page 229), calls this action "Stalin's defeat in China". He says:

"It was decided to consider the developments in China as signs of progress of the revolution: freed of the dead weight of the Kuomintang's right wing, the revolutionary movement could now develop into a Soviet movement in China! The new instructions called for the creation of peasants' soviets, the development of an agrarian revolution, the creation of a great new army, and, above all, the application of a Red Terror".

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He quotes the following resolution which the Executive Committee of the Communist International adopted April 14, 1927:

"We declare Chiang Kai-shek a traitor and an ally of the imperialist bandits, an enemy of the revolutionary Kuo-mintang, and enemy of the working class and of the Communist International".

The policy which Russia then impressed upon the Chinese Communists is the one they have strictly followed ever since.

What is written here is only a short summary of the manoeuvres - probably as complicated as any which history records - by which Russia pursued its long-time aim of expansion at China's expense. But it makes crystal clear that Russia, whether under the Czars or the Reds, has never relaxed its imperialistic designs upon China.

Yalta and after

China - to our shame and lasting detriment - was not consulted about the secret Yalta agreement which promised Russia vital rights in Manchuria. Early in 1945, when rumors began to leak out that China had been sold out at Yalta, I mentioned them to a leading Chinese official. He said: "If your country does this, it will pay for it many times over in American blood". Already the grim prophecy is coming true. After Yalta the Chinese Government was in no position to resist the combined pressure of Russia, the United States and Great Britain. So China sent delegates to Moscow who signed treaties on August 14, 1945, to give effect to this agreement.

China signed most reluctantly, impelled not only by American and British pressure but by a feeling that - matters having gone so far - it was better to avoid an outright break with Russia, and put in the record Russia's promise to support only the National Government rather than to face Russia's certain immediate hostility and

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interference on behalf of the Chinese Communists. But China's leaders had no faith in Russia's promises, and were not at all surprised to see them broken almost as soon as the ink was dry on the treaty.

Russia, after its "48-hour war" with Japan, occupied Manchuria. The occupation had three main features. First, the Russians looted about two billion dollars worth of machinery and raw materials and food. They claimed it was "war booty". But a chief motive was to prevent China from getting the invaluable industries - and to prevent Manchuria, with American help, from being integrated with both China and Japan in a way that might threaten Russia's predominance in that part of the world. Removal of the machinery caused great loss, and much of what the Russians took rusted away or was ruined by removal. This now has proved a blessing in disguise.

Second, the Russians turned over great stocks of captured Japanese arms and war supplies to the Chinese Communists.

Third, the Russian troops did not evacuate Manchuria until they were satisfied that Chinese Communists were ready to take over so much of its area as to make the National Government's problem impossible of solution.

The 1945 treaties were most unpopular in China. The people and government blamed both the United States and Russia - and justly.

When Mao Tze-tung and his aides went to Moscow in the latter part of 1949, after conquering continental China, a chief objective was a settlement that the Chinese public would believe restored at least some of China's position in Manchuria. The many weeks taken by negotiations showed that Mao did not have an easy time. But he was able to persuade Russia's leaders to make some concessions, at least on paper. ⁹ The Sino-Russian treaty of "friendship, alliance and mutual assistance" signed February 14, 1950, joined the two countries

"for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression."

This is doubtless alleged as the basis of China's intervention in Korea.

The treaty went on to say:

"In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or States allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal."

The parties could take this as giving a ground for direct Russian intervention in case military measures were taken against Chinese territory. Thus bombing of Manchurian air fields or industries might at least bring in Russian airplanes and perhaps submarines.

Besides this treaty, a second treaty dealt with return to China of some of the railway rights which Russia seized 50 years ago, which were then lost to Japan, and which the Yalta agreement restored to Russia. The preamble of this second treaty says that "a new approach" is possible because of the triumph in China of "a new People's Government".

Russia also agreed to withdraw its troops from Port Arthur. Besides, Russia agreed to transfer certain property in Dairen during 1950.

But the question of Port Dairen was to be further considered" upon conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. And Russia retained the Chinese Eastern Railway which bisects Manchuria.

These agreements, except the Dairen transfers, were to be carried out by the end of 1952 or upon conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, whichever is earlier.

Finally Russia granted China credits of \$300 million, at 1% interest. The credits were to be repaid by deliveries of raw materials or gold in 10 equal parts in 1954-57. China also could pay using the

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wicked "American dollars".

Will Russia carry out its promises? This is a fair question when any Communist country - not to speak of two - signs an agreement. Press reports of January 17, 1951, say that the Peiping radio announced that Russia had completed transfer to China of the properties in Manchuria to which the 1950 agreement relates. If Russia does not make good on the rest of the deal, its position in China will be definitely hurt.

As showing Russia's aims, after these agreements were made public another announcement was quietly made; that Russia would have the right for 30 years to help exploit oil and non-ferrous metals in Sinkiang Province, ^{in Central Asia} This is the only promising oil area of China. Sinkiang also contains uranium.

Russia still keeps special privileges in Manchuria. Despite desperate famine in China, hundreds of thousands of tons of Manchurian grains have gone to Russia in the past year. Russia keeps the Chinese Eastern Railway rights. Strong Russian forces are said to be at Harbin. Even after the Chinese Communists won Manchuria from the Nationalists, a strict border guard was kept between Manchuria and China proper.

Underlying all happenings is the Chinese Communists' 30-year tie with Russia. This runs counter to the long-time view in China that the United States is their friend and Russia a designing enemy. Though the Chinese people are familiar with propaganda and discount pro-Russian talk, these will have effect both now and in the long run. But they might be countered by obvious Russian deeds, and the plain fact of Russian interference in China.

Japan as the common enemy of China and Russia

The key position which Communist China and Russia gave to Japan in the 1950 agreement shows a line of common interest which dates back some distance.

China, far more than Russia, has felt the force of Japan at its worst. Many times in the half century up to 1945 Japan took advantage of China's weakness to seize territory - Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, Shantung (temporarily) and Manchuria. All this culminated when, in 1937, Japan began its disastrous crusade to make all China its vassal.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Chinese people feel deeply against Japan. This feeling is like that of the French against Germany.

Russia suffered defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-05, both on land and sea. That defeat, which checked for several decades Russia's drive for a warm water port, has rankled in Russian memory. Japan has remained a chief enemy of Russia.

After Hitler's rise, Russia faced threats on two fronts, west and east. There can be no question of Russia's growing fear of Japan following Japan's "Manchukuo" adventure beginning in 1931. By 1936, Russia had definitely concluded it should work with China in resisting Japan. This policy led Russia to support the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek. This was despite Chiang having thrown the Russians out of China 10 years earlier.

It is now clear that Russia urged moderation on the Chinese Communists when they kidnaped Chiang at Sian in December, 1936. Russian influence probably saved his life, since Russia felt that he was the only man who could unite China against Japan. (See Hu Shih, "China in Stalin's Grand Strategy", Foreign Affairs, October 1950, Page 32).

When Japan attacked China in July, 1937, Russia started giving aid to China in March, 1938, nine months before the United States did. This aid was not only in the form of credits totalling \$250,000,000, of which China used two-thirds. Russia sent to China planes and aviators to fight the Japanese and also military supplies.

Yet Russia was not a whole-hearted ally of China. Because of fear of a two-front war Russia felt bound to appease Japan. In April, 1941, Russia and Japan signed a five-year neutrality pact. This suited both since Russia feared German attack, which came in June, 1941, despite the Russo-German non-aggression pact of August, 1939; and Japan wished to be free to push its adventures in Southeastern Asia and the Pacific. Also Russia refused to allow transit of lend-lease trucks and supplies to China via Central Asia.

But Russia's fear of Japan was so strong that Russian arms and supplies went to the Chinese Nationalists only. There is no evidence that appreciable Russian aid went to the Chinese Communists during the Sino-Japanese war, 1937-45. Russia, however, certainly advised and largely controlled them through usual Comintern channels.

The Communist party line was strong in praise of Nationalist China and Chiang until early 1943, when the Russians defeated the Germans at Stalingrad. Also the American forces had begun rolling back the Japanese in the Pacific. Russia felt sure of final victory, and changed the party line to attack Chiang and support the Chinese Communists.

In 1948, when the war ended, there was one point on which all Chinese factions - Nationalists and Communists - strongly agreed. That was that Japan must be kept down militarily, politically and even economically. In China there was practical unanimity in opposing the American and allied plan to rehabilitate Japan, even though Japan was being disarmed.

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Russia likewise has been firmly opposed to any Japanese revival, unless under full Russian control. One of the gains which Russia won at Yalta was the Kurile Islands which guard the eastern approach to Siberia.

Thus, apart from Communist doctrine, Red China and Russia despite basic conflicts can readily find a major common interest for the present at least in policy toward Japan. This easily extends to opposing the United States - which is now the chief arbiter of Japan's destiny.

Where the United States comes in

To Americans it is a shock to see China as an enemy. The United States has long befriended China, has never sought Chinese territory, has been the leader in aiding China to recover full national status, and has given China generous aid, both diplomatic and financial, on many occasions.

To innumerable Chinese, other than Communists, it is also a shock to find China opposed to the United States. A large part of China's leaders have been educated in the United States or American-sponsored colleges. In China there remain many faithful friends of the United States.

How real is the split which the Communists are engineering between the United States and China? Certainly it is real, deep and permanent so far as concerns the Chinese Communists now in control. They are steeped in Russian Communist ideology. From the beginning they have "leaned to one side", as Mao puts it - the Russian side. This means not merely to love Russia but to hate all who do not bow down to Russia, conspicuously the United States. They promote a long-term program of miseducation whereby students, from the youngest to the oldest, have drummed into them a constant refrain: the Soviet

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Union is "a kind and loving Big Brother"; the United States is "capitalistic" and "imperialistic".

But, besides that, the Chinese Communists have in their view real and independent grievances against us. We aided and are aiding their arch-enemy, Chiang Kai-shek. Our policy is to keep alive opposition to their regime and to seek its downfall. We prevent their effort to take Formosa, which was promised to China at Cairo. We refuse to recognize them, despite the extent of their control of China. We block their admission to the UN.

They are trying to popularize their grievances and turn them into a nation-wide anti-American attitude. Randall Gould, former editor of the Shanghai Evening Post, writing in the Christian Science Monitor January 16, 1951, quotes a Shanghai propagandist sheet as follows:

"In face of repeated American violation of China's territorial air and waters, in bombing Chinese towns and strafing Chinese citizens.....countless Chinese people in Shanghai and east China who have been outraged by the American imperialists during the past have been once more roused to indignation, and demand vengeance".

This refers to the Nationalists' futile and ill-advised bombing of cities in 1949-50, using "American-Chiang Kai-shek bombers".

This, and incidents of occasional friction with American troops in Shanghai in 1945-46, are used to stir up Chinese troops in Korea. The Chinese troops are being told, and seem largely to believe, that they are in Korea to stop American forces that plot to seize parts of China which the imperialists covet. But we still have friends in China. Not long ago an American well-known in his community was leaving the Chinese port where he had lived. The coolies who carried his baggage, poor as they were, refused any pay.

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Why did the Chinese Communists decide to enter the war in Korea? This is risky for many reasons. China is very war-weary. It is suffering acute famine and depression. Its war potential is quite limited. Communist control within China is incomplete. The regime faces a huge task of political and economic consolidation. Fresh war threatens to destroy one of the Communists' real accomplishments - the checking of inflation. War has the seeds of possible disintegration, since it gives internal enemies a chance to rise.

The Chinese Communists intervened in Korea for several reasons. First, it was Moscow policy and they were willing partners of Moscow. Their hatred of the United States, as already shown, is deeply rooted in Communist ideology and in our aid to their foes. Then they want to strengthen China's bargaining position for admission to the UN, for general recognition, to have a voice in Korea, to have something to trade for Formosa. Also for dictators war is a time-honored means to divert attention from ugly internal facts.

The attack upon South Korea may even have been conceived when Mao was in Moscow early in 1950. Much of the North Korean army consisted of Koreans living in China who were part of China's Red Army. Thus the attack could have been planned only with full collusion of the leaders of Red China.

Also the deployment of the Red Chinese army shows that its direct entry into the Korean war was long planned if the North Koreans needed aid. The prestige of world Communism was at stake when North Korean resistance began to collapse. Just as the United States had felt bound to press the UN to act because anything else would have condoned aggression and destroyed confidence in common action to resist Russia, so Russia felt bound to show its satellites

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that they would not be abandoned when they were losing.

Besides, Russia hopes to see the United States distracted from Europe and bogged down in fruitless wars in Asia. So far as possible Russia prefers to fight vicariously using satellite troops as cannon fodder.

Finally, strengthening China's military power is to Red China's leaders an end in itself. It trains forces for later adventures in Southern Asia. It puts Red China in a better position to get Russian arms. Also, as there are many in the Chinese Communist movement who are patriotic Chinese, there is the possibility that this adventure might put China in a better position to deal with Russia. An aggrandized China, inflamed by conquests, could be more nearly a partner of Russia than a puppet. And an eventual equal. But the Chinese Communists may have miscalculated the factors. Intervention in Korea could prove to have been a grave blunder for them and for Communism in general.

The balance Sheet

What is the prospect of a split between China and Russia?

It is clear that there are basic elements of friction. In the long run Chinese nationalism will not tolerate Russian or other foreign dictation. Indeed China may try to conquer Southern Asia for itself - Indo-China, Siam, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines - following in Japan's footsteps. Certainly China wants Hongkong. Russia will not be able to turn China's nationalism on and off at will. By helping to stir up rampant nationalism in China, Russia may have opened Pandora's box. The apparent hesitancy of Russia to equip Red China's troops with modern arms, as they equipped the North Koreans, may be an indication that they realize this.

In China there is enormous discontent. The Communists have ex-

tended to China a harsh and alien way of life - the Russian system of seeking ends of power and production regardless of human cost. They collect drastic taxes ^{in grain} although the farmers starve. They export food to Russia despite utter famine and lack of the usual heavy food imports. They even offer a million tons of rice to India in exchange for jute. Their vaunted works of reconstruction are built, in effect, like the Egyptian pyramids - with the bodies of the people.

Persons lately returned from China say that each day truck-loads of beggars are rounded up in Shanghai and shipped out to no-one-knows-where.

There are hundreds of thousands of hostile guerillas. ^{ff} There are strong pro-Chinese elements among the Communists, who now have to be quiet, but who would like to change if and when they can cease being Russian tools.

It is clear also that Russia has not relaxed its imperialistic designs upon China. By dominating China, Russia is realizing its ambition to exploit Manchuria, now that Japan is forced off the Asiatic continent as England was forced out of Europe long ago. There are serious unsettled questions about Manchuria, notably as to the Chinese Eastern Railway and Dairen. China and Russia remain in basic conflict over Manchuria, though for a time it may be beneath the surface.

Another point of friction is Korea. That unhappy country was formerly China's vassal, then was fought for by Russia and Japan when China was weak and stood on the side lines. Japan won, but Russia momentarily took easy control of North Korea in 1945. Now China may gain the upper hand in influence on Korea, on the Red side.

Then there is the long frontier reaching westward nearly five thousand miles from the sea of Japan into the center of Asia. Russia aggression in this region is well-known to the Chinese people, and is a real sore point.

Finally, there are the Russians. Despite playing a clever game of chess on the international scene, they are pretty crude operators. They give little and take much. The influx of hordes of Russian technicians and advisers into China in the last two or three years

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has been poorly received by the Chinese people. Russian clumsiness and brutality will make enemies wherever Russia tries to dictate policy.

On the other hand, however, it is clear that for the short run Russia has seized control of the Chinese revolution through men acting as willing puppets. Though they have stirred up bitter resentment in China they have gained fanatical followers. Their overthrow does not now seem near at hand.

Titoism and spread of like ideas among the satellites are causing enormous worry to Russia. But that makes Russia and the Kremlin's stooges everywhere all the more alert to hold the satellites in line. One does not lightly revolt against any Communist regime. The organization is so strong and ruthless that to fail is suicide.

China has strong patriotic feeling which the Communists exploit - by use of the flag, parades, movies and constant propaganda. Early Chinese successes in Korea and Red China's stronger diplomatic position have strengthened the regime - even though the people, long distrustful of propaganda, will not fully believe all they are told. But here the Reds are handling a dangerous weapon. Military losses and diplomatic defeats can hurt them.

Then there is Japan. It is easy for clever propagandists to present the United States, in the vanguard of the UN, as Japan's associate and as supplanting Japan in Korea.

But the determining factor is that China's ^{Red} leaders are all bound up with Russia.

Up to a point, Mao can deliver Communist China as a pawn in the Russian game. But Red China is more than a Russian puppet. It may not be compared with "Manchukuo", or the Wang Ching-wei regime in China during the war, as Japanese puppets. These had

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no real popular support, and their troops were almost wholly unreliable. The Mao regime has much popular support - the Chinese troops now in Korea could not fight as they are doing did they not have their hearts in it to some degree.

Communist China is greatly different from such satellites as Poland and Czechoslovakia which are held down mainly by crude Russian force and have no semblance of independence. In China the Communists won by their own efforts - aided by Nationalist and American blunders and by the strains and stresses caused by long years of war and inflation. Mao and company did not win primarily by direct Russian interference, other than by handing over ^{and other Russian action} Japanese arms in Manchuria.

In China public opinion is still a factor. Mao cannot carry China along regardless of anything, or at least he cannot do so indefinitely. He can continue to deliver China's policies and action to Russia only if these and the results are, or appear to be, in line with China's interests and aspirations.

Communist control of China is not likely to be upset so long as world-wide communism is having successes. But if and when Russia is involved in grave difficulties, if China gets into more and more trouble because of the link to Russia, and if adventures beyond China's borders bring more grief than glory, pro-Chinese elements within the Communists are certain to grow in strength. Communist China will show more and more independence. And at the right time, by action of the right sort by patriotic Chinese with the right kind of external aid, China once more can become free.

The Russian system of trying to dominate other countries is "against nature". Certainly the Chinese revolution is against any form of foreign control. It will not be complete so long as China is used as a tool of Russian imperialism. China wants freedom from

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any foreign control, including control by Russia.

It is vital to remember one thing; that in the long run what happens in China depends mostly upon the Chinese themselves. Though long-run factors are working for a split between Red China and Russia, no one can say how long is the long run. It is wishful thinking to expect an early split. Yet there are factors that could bring it to pass.

What do we do now?

The free world, and our country in particular, face a most thorny dilemma in fighting Chinese aggression, which is largely Russian aggression in disguise, and at the same time not antagonizing the Chinese people and trying to woo China away from Russia. What should we do, and what should we avoid?

What happens in the Far East is so vital to us that, as background for a wise policy, the public should demand of both political parties greater national unity and less politics about Far Eastern problems.

As the basis of policy we must not for a moment forget that the Chinese and Russian Communist leaders are allied in a drive to bring all Asia under their control, as a step toward world domination. Their tactics, whether fighting or negotiation, are only means to that end. So long as they maintain their program of aggression, it makes no sense to rely upon words instead of deeds.

Now for specific points;

1. We certainly were right to insist, with almost unanimous bipartisan backing, that Communist China be labelled an aggressor. This keeps the record straight and is of enormous moral and propaganda value. But the action to be taken to punish aggression is not cut and

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dried by any means. It depends upon a weighing of consequences and balancing the forces to be allocated to opposing Communism in the Far East and elsewhere. Also we should avoid needless suffering for the Chinese people and playing into the hands of Communist propagandists.

2. To admit Communist China to the UN, as matters now stand, would condone flagrant aggression. It would condone the lies told the Chinese people and their unhappy soldiers intended to make them think that it is they who are threatened with "imperialistic" attack by America, and to disguise Russian imperialism. It would hurt the UN by adding a veto in the Security Council and support for Russia's obstructionism.

The preamble to the UN charter requires members to "practice tolerance and live together in peace as good neighbors". Also they undertake "That armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest". If Red China made such promises, would they be worth anything?

The United States has left it to the UN to decide upon China's admission. We should insist that the members of the UN give realistic weight to these matters.

3. For similar reasons we are right in refusing to recognize Communist China. To recognize is to enter into diplomatic relations. How could one justify this while the Communist regime wages war against the UN? To have recognized them over a year ago, when they drove Nationalist troops from the mainland, probably, though this is not certain, would have had little effect upon the course of events. Look how the Communists heaped insults upon the British after they recognized the regime, refusing to recognize back. But American recognition would have been a bitter disappointment to the great body of Chinese who oppose communism, would have helped the new regime.

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80-00926A003300050014-7 Formosa.

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4. We should prevent the Communists from seizing Formosa. It does not make sense to hand over Formosa to a regime so clearly engaged in aggressive war as are the Chinese Communists. Or to turn over to their tender mercies the Western-minded Chinese now in Formosa who will be needed when China can again be free - not to speak of the hapless Formosans.

5. We should keep on with the fight in Korea. As rearmament goes ahead, the UN may well increase its strength there, to the extent consistent with needs elsewhere. The war in Asia, as Hu Shih and others believe, may be Russia's main war effort for some time to come. Fighting in Korea lessens the chances of aggression by Communist China elsewhere. It is a safeguard to Japan. It heartens the opponents of Communism in China as well as throughout the free world, who got a big lift when the UN acted in Korea. To settle on Communist terms would be a grave defeat. In any event, the record must be kept straight, and aggression remain labelled as such and unratified by any appeasing action by the UN.

6. We should intensify the spread of the facts and make intelligent propaganda by the Voice of America and other means in support of UN intervention and American relation to Korea in every practicable way in China and in all other parts of the world.

Equally, or even more important, we must avoid serious blunders.

1. Certainly we should not be drawn into a general war against China or Chinese territory. This would be futile. Only the Chinese can run China. The years of Japanese effort at conquest only bogged

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them down in a morass.

2. A limited war by bombing and naval bombardment far from the combat zone would likewise be futile. China has few important targets and the damage to these would be far more than offset by the lift to Communist morale within China that would come from resentment of those in the regions attacked. As one who experienced scores of air-raids in China during the Sino-Japanese war, I can testify to the aid they gave to Chinese morale and the relatively minor damage done or that could have been done to the war effort of China.

3. Bombing of troops and supplies and perhaps munitions plants, in the immediate zone near to Korea, might be an exception to the above. But this should not be done unless really major air attacks are made on our forces and shipping, and unless the UN is prepared to run the risk of bringing Russia into the war. Russian planes and submarines could be run by "volunteers", perhaps in first instance of Asiatic extraction.

If for any reason UN planes should be flying over Chinese territory, in most regions they should drop leaflets and not bombs. The Chinese did this in 1938 when they sent their one and only flight of planes over Japan.

4. There should be no ill-considered intervention in China's internal affairs. Some form of external aid to overthrow the Communists is sure to be needed. But it is a highly delicate matter, and a blunder could have the gravest consequences. The people as a whole doubtless wish to rid themselves of the Communists, but both foreigners and Chinese who lately have left China doubt that the people would favor return of the old regime - certainly without drastic changes, and the Communists have strong backing among sections of the people of China - as shown by their morale in Korea.

the regime can be thrown out only by a revolt from within, or by a genuine popular movement within China which, in turn, will lead to revolt from within.

In any country foreign intervention is likely to solidify public opinion behind those who oppose it most vocally and vigorously. It is easy for the "ins" to rally the public as a whole, and even a good share of the "outs", on that issue. Look at what happened when we opposed Peron in Argentina. Ill-considered intervention in China could lead to a failure and defeat that would strengthen the hold of the Communists. Also it could cause huge suffering and loss of life to liberal and democratic elements - in fact just talk about it has already done so.

Our government will be wise if it seeks and considers with care the counsel of patriotic Chinese outside of China - independents as well as Nationalists - as to the best means and the timing of events to seek the overthrow of the present regime and the likely result of any given action that might smack of foreign interference.

Finally, we must not forget that Russia has its own troubles and its dilemma in China. In stirring up nationalism it unsheathes a two-edged sword. For the present Chinese nationalism may help Russia. But the Chinese people are too proud and patriotic and conscious of their long and distinguished history to stand indefinitely for any alien domination.